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1069 
LET THE DAMAGES FIT THE WRONG: AN IMMODEST 
PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING PERSONAL INJURY 
DAMAGES 
Elaine W. Shoben* 
The modern legislative approach to tort reform has been a 
piecemeal process of altering single rules rather than reconsidering the 
fundamental principle of compensatory damages—the goal of making 
victims whole.  When some aspect of damage doctrine has become 
disfavored, such as joint and several liability, legislatures1 and 
sometimes courts2 have made a change in that one rule.3  Lawmakers 
have focused little on the overall remedial scheme in tort4 and even less 
on the basic premise of compensatory damages and whether it is still 
justifiable. 
Rather than comment on the wisdom of piecemeal reform, this 
 
* Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas.  Edward W. Cleary Professor Emerita, University of Illinois College of Law.  The author 
wishes to thank Marsha Peterson for her research assistance and her colleagues at the Remedies 
Forum, University of Louisville 2005, as well as colleagues at the Boyd School of Law faculty 
workshop for their many useful comments. 
 1. State legislatures have taken a variety of actions on this specific rule—abolishing it, 
modifying it, or applying it only to particular types of recovery.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
21-111.5 (West 2001) (abolishing joint liability in personal injury actions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:15-5.3 (West 2001) (modifying rule such that a defendant less than 60% responsible is severally 
liable only); Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.1 (West 2001) (stating that liability of each defendant for 
noneconomic damages is severally liable only). 
 2. See, e.g., Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2000). 
 3. The same process has occurred with other isolated doctrines, such as the collateral source 
rule.  It has come under legislative attack in some jurisdictions with resulting abolition or 
modification of the rule in some states.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (West 2000) 
(abolishing the rule—court shall reduce the verdict by the amount of any collateral payments not 
paid as a result of a contract entered into and paid for by or on behalf of the plaintiff); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 34-44-1-3 (West 2001) (modifying the rule—proof of collateral benefits shall be considered 
by the trier of fact in assessing damages). 
 4. For a helpful discussion of medical malpractice statutory reforms, see Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Caps and the Construction of Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: NEW CENTURY, DIFFERENT ISSUES 148-66 
(Rogan Kersh & William Sage, eds. Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming 2006). 
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article questions the premise of compensatory damages and takes the 
position that make-whole recovery is an unnecessary consequence of 
liability and does not necessarily achieve just results.  With apologies to 
Gilbert and Sullivan who contributed the refrain “[L]et the punishment 
fit the crime,”5 I propose that civil damages should fit the wrong.6  
Compensatory damages should abandon the make-whole premise and be 
measured by three factors: the degree of the wrongfulness of the tort, the 
severity of the harm, and the extent to which the risky conduct was 
directed at the plaintiff—which I call connectedness. 
The popular outrage at highly-publicized tort cases7—or caricatures 
of those cases—is directed not at the fact of liabitiy but at the amount of 
damages.  One can only speculate how the public would have reacted to 
the McDonald’s coffee case8 if the headline had read “Woman Recovers 
Ten Thousand Dollars After Receiving Burn from Scalding Hot Coffee.”  
Similarly, one wonders how the public would respond to a headline 
“Drunken Surgeon Pays Millions to Patient After Botched Operation.”  
If society’s sense of justice demands that a drunken surgeon pay more 
for botching an operation than a restaurant pay for serving scalding 
coffee, then why should the recovery turn on the circumstances of the 
plaintiff’s loss?  It is entirely possible that the botched operation caused 
less damage than the scalding coffee.  Maybe the surgeon removed a 
healthy appendix instead of a cyst and the patient simply needed a 
second surgery.  Maybe the scalding coffee caused second degree burns 
in the crotch when it spilled between the patron’s legs.9 Although tort 
liability should not turn on a public opinion poll, the purpose of this 
observation is to suggest that notions of fundamental justice do not 
require the make-whole rule.  Other rules might serve societal goals as 
well. 
My suggested reform of the compensatory principle of personal 
 
 5. W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF 
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 343, 382 (1936). 
 6. My apologies must extend to Professor Jeffrey G. Sherman as well.  He wrote a wonderful 
piece explaining how W.S. Gilbert and his work have been misunderstood, but I am simply adding 
on to the popular misuse.  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Law’s Lunacy: W.S. Gilbert and His Deux ex 
Lege, 83 OR. L. REV. 1035 (2004). 
 7. For a thoughtful account of the tort crisis, including a critique of the metaphors used for 
the “torts crisis” and the types of cases portrayed as “bad,” see Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, 
Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989 (1998). 
 8. There is no reported opinion of this highly-publicized trial in New Mexico, Liebeck v. 
McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., but it is famous enough to be referenced by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 9. Id. at 653 (explaining plaintiff’s injuries, which are analogous to plaintiff’s injuries in the 
McDonald’s coffee case). 
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injury damages would not necessarily favor either plaintiffs or 
defendants.10  Its purpose is to cut transaction costs and to redistribute 
personal injury compensation such that small claims would be more 
viable than they are currently, and large claims would not produce a 
windfall to attorneys or, through punitive damages, to litigants.  The 
tools to achieve these goals are: (1) altering the measure of 
compensatory damages to subsume the wrongfulness of the conduct and 
thus to eliminate punitive damages; and (2) permitting hourly attorney 
fees for prevailing plaintiffs in place of contingency fees, thus increasing 
the availability of representation for small claims without altering 
availability for large claims. 
The suggested reform would alter the basis for recovery and 
produce results satisfying the other goals of tort law beyond the make-
whole principle.  Actors would be deterred from engaging in conduct 
that risks injury to others and especially serious injury toward 
identifiable victims.  To the extent that some plaintiffs would not receive 
full compensation for their losses, other societal safety nets are 
necessary; that result is no different from the situation of plaintiffs who 
are injured by conduct that is not tortious or that is committed by actors 
who are judgment-proof.  The proposed scheme meets other goals of tort 
law: deterrence, retribution, and a societal sense of justice.  
Compensation is still present as well, but the goal of make-whole 
compensation is not. 
This proposed reform permits compensatory damages on the basis 
of three factors: the degree of the wrongfulness of the tort, the severity 
of the harm, and the closeness of the connection between the wrong and 
the harm.  The resulting damages combine some (but only some) 
elements of traditional compensatory damages (the severity of the 
harm)11 with some elements from punitive damages (the wrongfulness of 
the conduct)12 and some elements of legal causation (connectedness).13  
By necessity, the new approach would replace both compensatory and 
punitive damages and would not be governed by the existing law related 
to those standards.  The connectedness requirement would supplement 
other proximate cause inquiries to proportion liability for remotely 
 
 10. The lack of favor to one interest group may well make this piece academic in all senses of 
the word.  Without an interest group to promote such a legislative scheme, it has little chance of 
passage.  Nonetheless, cynicism should not prevail to dampen public discussion of the issues. 
 11. For shameless self-promotion, see ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & 
RACHEL M. JANUTIS, REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS ch. 11 (3d ed., Foundation Press, 2002). 
 12. Id. at ch. 15. 
 13. Id. at ch. 13. 
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caused injuries.  Concepts of contributory and comparative negligence 
remain and function to reduce recovery in much the same manner as 
current law.14 
A significant goal of this proposed reform is to provide a more 
consistent and predictable framework for assessing damages.15 
Consistency and predictability would foster the goal of compensating a 
greater number of tort victims in levels proportionate to the degree of 
injury and wrong to the level of monetary recovery.  Consistency and 
predictability also foster settlement and thus reduce the transaction costs 
of trial preparation.  A more predictable amount of liability, with interest 
dating from the time of filing suit, fosters speedier settlement and 
delivery of compensation to victims when they need the money for 
rehabilitation.  Finally, the proposal includes an award of attorney’s fees.  
In place of contingency fees, plaintiff’s attorneys could recover fees on a 
reasonable hourly basis.  The extensive litigation surrounding such 
awards in the civil rights context provides ample precedent for this 
change. 
I.  THE PROPOSED THREE ELEMENTS FOR TORT DAMAGES
 
A.  Degree of Wrongfulness 
The first element of the proposed reform measure of personal injury 
damages is the degree to which the defendant’s conduct was wrongful.  
Practitioners have long recognized that this factor is already one that 
affects juries even though the judge does not include it in the instructions 
for measuring compensatory damages.16  It is frequently noted, for 
example, that negligence is “hot” and strict liability is “cold” such that a 
 
 14. Id. at ch. 11. 
 15. See Catharine Pierce Wells, A Pragmatic Approach to Improving Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1447 (2001). 
 16. Conventional wisdom has been scientifically documented. 
[J]urors in tort cases seek ‘total justice’ in a number of interrelated senses. . . . It is in this 
sense that jurors’ susceptibility to the hindsight effect and inability to disregard certain 
pieces of information come into play.  This “holistic” approach to jury decision making 
often leads jurors to make global judgments about who did what to whom, who should 
pay for it, and how much, rather than separating judgments about liability and damages, 
or about different types of damages, into discrete steps as the law requires.  As a result, 
jurors have a tendency to fuse discrete judgments into a jumbled, interrelated whole. 
EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY 
AWARDS 142 (American Psychological Association 2002) (citing NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL 
BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (American Psychological Association) 
(2001)). 
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good plaintiff’s attorney would never fail to put before a jury the facts 
showing that risk was taken even if liability could be established without 
negligence.17  The proposed reform elevates that concept to a legal 
standard in measuring damages. 
Consider five plaintiffs, each of whom suffers brain damage from 
tortious conduct.  Plaintiff One is a college student who was the victim 
of a brutal beating by defendants who hated him because of his sexual 
orientation.  Plaintiff Two is an employed adult injured in an auto 
accident caused by a drunk driver.  Plaintiff Three is a baby who lost 
oxygen to the brain during birth through the negligence of a resident 
doctor in the hospital.  Plaintiff Four is a baby whose mother ingested a 
drug during pregnancy that caused brain damage to the developing fetus.  
PLaintiff Five is a baby that was injured in an auto accident when the 
child restraint device malfunctioned because of an unforeseen design 
defect. 
Assume that each of these five plaintiffs can establish liability and 
that all five suffered permanent brain damage.  Under modern damages 
law, each of these brain-damaged plaintiffs would recover differing 
amounts based upon the life circumstances of the five.  All would 
receive money for a lifetime of care.  The babies would recover for a 
lifetime of lost average wages.  The recovery of the employed adult 
would turn on his or her socio-economic status in terms of lost future 
wages.  The college student’s recovery would turn on the evidence of his 
probable future earning capacity based upon his existing record.  These 
amounts will vary greatly on the basis of the legal standards applied to 
damages, even without regard to the natural variability that one would 
expect from the degree of uncertainty inherent in the calculation of these 
amounts and the presentation of these issues before different fact-
finders.18  The amount actually received by each plaintiff will turn on 
even more factors: the presence or absence of state statutory caps on 
damages, tax calculations, estimates of future inflation, reduction to 
present value, and so forth.  Punitive damages may also be available for 
 
 17. Consider, for example, the asbestos injury claim in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. 
Ballard, 749 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1999).  The plaintiff, a construction worker who developed lung 
disease after working with defendant’s asbestos product for years, had two theories of liability: strict 
liability and negligence.  The negligence theory was that the company continued to manufacture the 
product with asbestos rather than safer materials after it learned of the hazards of asbestos.  This 
theory also supported punitive damages on the grounds that the conduct displayed a reckless 
disregard of the safety of others. 
 18. See generally JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY 
(LRP 44th ed. 2005) (reporting wide ranges of recovery for similarly situated personal injury 
victims). 
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the first plaintiff and possibly for the second, but, absent additional facts, 
not for the babies.  Finally, whatever the final mystery sum becomes the 
damages for each of these five, the plaintiff’s attorney will probably take 
a third. 
Under the proposed reform, the variability in recovery would turn 
on the basis of the defendant’s liability.  This factor would weigh 
heavily against the brutal attackers of Plaintiff One.  It would weigh 
lightly against the defendant who injured Plaintiff Five, against whom 
we have assumed liability that would have to be on the basis of absolute 
liability.
 
B.  Severity of the Harm 
The second factor in the proposed reform is the severity of the harm 
to the plaintiff.  This factor is the one that most closely resembles current 
law.19  A plaintiff who receives a scratch should receive less than one 
with severe injuries, even if both were maliciously inflicted.  Where the 
proposal differs from current damage law, however, is that evidence 
would be restricted to the most general kind of proof of the severity of 
the injury.  Juries would not hear about the projected costs of future 
surgeries, for example, but would simply learn that the plaintiff’s 
injuries are such that future surgeries will be necessary.  Similarly, 
plaintiffs could not produce evidence of projected future lost wages, but 
they could prove the length of time for which it will not be possible to 
work in establishing the severity of the harm. 
This element, unlike the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, 
may cause over-deterrence in the same manner that it does in the current 
tort system.  When an actor takes a risk of a small harm to another but a 
great harm occurs, the resulting civil “punishment” may be excessive to 
the degree of harm risked.  Tort law has long struggled with the 
conflicting goals of compensation and deterrence in this context.  The 
factor of the severity of the injury remains an element of recovery in this 
proposal as a compromise between the conflicting interests at stake.  
Unlike modern law, this factor is only one of three, such that there will 
still be large recovery for severely injured plaintiffs, but less so for those 
who were unfortunate enough to suffer large injury when the defendant 
took a small risk (or no risk for strict liability).
 
 
 19. See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 369, 369-423 (Matthew Bender & 
Co. 1999) (discussing remedies for various bodily injuries). 
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C.  Connectedness between Defendant’s Wrong and Plaintiff’s Injury 
The final element of the three proposed factors is the extent to 
which the actor’s risk was connected to the plaintiff’s harm.  Although 
issues of connectedness affect the substantive question of liability 
through proximate cause and other doctrines, this issue is appropriately 
reintroduced as a damages limitation capable of assessment on a sliding 
scale. 
Injuries that are remote in time or space may not be the legal, or 
proximate, cause of the harm, and such lack of connectedness may 
preclude all liability.  For those cases that survive to damages, the 
connectedness limitation ought to be a factor in determining the amount 
of damages.  Injuries that are remotely connected to the wrong in terms 
of time or space are less compelling cases for compensation than those 
that are closely connected.  The DES daughters cases,20 for example, 
involved liability for the effects of medication that occurred a generation 
later when adult women were adversely affected by an anti-miscarriage 
pill taken by their mothers when the daughters were in utero.  Once 
liability is found, it would be appropriate under this proposal to make the 
remoteness of the injury a factor in the damage assessment. 
Connectedness takes many forms.  First, reconsider the famous set 
of hypothetical plaintiffs in Judge Andrews’ dissenting opinion in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.21  A car accident unforeseeably causes 
an explosion of dynamite, and individuals are injured both near and far 
from the accident.  Judge Andrews argues that recovery ought to depend 
on how naturally the chain of events flowed from the accident.  He 
criticized the majority opinion written by Judge Cardozo for artificially 
limiting liability to those individuals who were foreseeably injured at the 
time of the negligent act, specifically, those who were within the 
contemplation of the actor at the time of the risk.  Many jurisdictions 
follow the Cardozo rule to limit liability as a matter of substantive law, 
but many others continue to permit more remotely foreseeable plaintiffs.  
When those claims survive to the damage stage, it is appropriate under 
this proposal to factor in the remoteness of the claim in the calculation of 
damages. 
II.  REPLACEMENT OF CONTINGENCY FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES 
The “American Rule” with respect to attorney’s fees holds that each 
 
 20. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal.3d 588 (1980). 
 21. 248 N.Y. 339, 353 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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party bears its own costs of litigation.  Attorneys’ fees are traditionally 
not awarded to the prevailing party in litigation absent an exception.  
Those exceptions include statutory authorization, contractual agreement, 
and certain equitable considerations such as bad faith litigation.  The 
American Rule is distinguished from the approach used by jurisdictions 
sharing our Anglo legal heritage that allows the prevailing party to 
recover attorney’s fees.22 
The function of the American Rule in personal injury cases is to 
make recovery of fees for the plaintiff’s attorney based on a contingency 
contract.  In the typical contingency contract, the plaintiff’s attorney 
recovers no fees unless the claim produces a monetary award or 
settlement.  In that event, the attorney typically recovers a third of the 
award. 
The usual policy consideration that supports the American Rule is 
that imposing fees may discourage the legitimate use of the court system 
and be difficult to measure.  A frequent objection to the rule is that it 
encourages litigation by not penalizing losers.23 
The last half of the twentieth century has produced data that should 
alter the assessment of the policy considerations affecting the American 
Rule.  Fee-shifting in civil rights and employment discrimination cases 
has produced an ample body of case law and practical experience with 
fee-shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs24 and, in rare cases, for 
prevailing defendants.25  The same scheme could profitably be used for 
personal injury plaintiffs. 
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 197626 provides 
that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party to recover 
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.  Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196427 makes a similar provision for employment 
discrimination litigants.  Courts presumptively allow recovery of fees to 
the successful plaintiff under these statutes and do not require a showing 
of bad faith.  The calculation of fees is based on a number of factors.28 
 
 22. On the role of attorney’s fees as a deliberate remedy, see the general discussion in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 n. 39 
(1975). 
 23. The Supreme Court discusses these principles generally in a copyright case involving 
attorney’s fees. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 522-31 (1994). 
 24. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968). 
 25. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 
 26. 42 U.S.C.§ 1988. 
 27. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e. 
 28. The Supreme Court endorsed the “lodestar” method for calculation of statutory attorney’s 
fees—a reasonable hourly rate multiplied times the number of hours reasonably expended—in 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).  In that case it further endorsed the factors for 
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The federal fee-shifting statutes typically provide for the recovery 
of attorney fees to the “prevailing party” or “prevailing plaintiff.”  The 
Supreme Court has held that a party is prevailing within the meaning of 
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act “when actual relief on the 
merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the 
parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly 
benefits the plaintiff.”29  The same approach could be used for personal 
injury plaintiffs.30 
Although many federal fee-shifting statutes provide for the 
recovery of attorney fees to the “prevailing party,” the Supreme Court 
has applied a higher standard for awarding fees to successful defendants.  
It has held that a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination case 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ordinarily will receive a fee award 
absent special circumstances, but a prevailing defendant can recover fees 
only by showing that the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad 
faith.”31  The dual standard was justified to encourage private attorney 
general suits to protect civil rights while also to shield such claimants 
from potential fee liability when the suit was meritorious yet 
unsuccessful. 
Although the private attorney general rationale does not apply to 
personal injury plaintiffs, the experience with fee-shifting in this body of 
law can support a statutory scheme for personal injury plaintiffs that 
would overtly apply a different standard for prevailing plaintiffs and 
 
determination of the reasonable fee in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714 (5th 
Cir. 1974).  The Court in Johnson identifies 12 factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary 
fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and 
ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.  Id. at 717-19. 
 29. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). 
 30. The issue is the policy question of whether to encourage the advancement of this type of 
litigation through the use of attorney’s fees.  The Supreme Court addressed the related question in 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), where the Court held that a prevailing defendant in a 
copyright infringement action would be awarded fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff 
under the Copyright Act.  The Court noted that the public interest concerns in advancing civil rights 
were not equally present in the goals of the Copyright Act, and thus it did not use the approach 
previously outlined in Christianberg Garment, 434 U.S. 412.  See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526-27.  The 
Court nonetheless declined to follow the “British Rule,” which awards attorney fees as a matter of 
course to the prevailing party, and it noted that the trial court still retains equitable discretion in 
making the award.  Id. at 534-35. 
 31.  Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 
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defendants.  Suits that are filed frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation can support attorney’s fees for defendants, but such findings 
have been rare in civil rights cases.  Plaintiffs would not be deterred 
from filing reasonable claims for fear of fee liability, but plaintiff 
attorneys would not recover more than a reasonable hourly fee for their 
successful claims.
 
III.  SCALES 
The following illustrations are provided as only the most general 
kind of examples of how such a system could work.  It is a primitive 
beginning to illustrate the potential for thinking along the lines of 
measuring damages more simply.  The idea is to take some kind of 
indicator number (such as a percentage of the median house price in the 
United States) and multiply it by some scale representing the severity of 
the harm, the wrongfulness of the conduct, and the degree of connection 
between the defendant’s wrong and the plaintiff’s injury.  Then the 
jurisdiction could use whatever comparative negligence rule it has 
chosen.  For purposes of this example, a pure comparative negligence 
system has been assumed (and even further simplified for illustrative 
purposes). 
The scales here are meant only to illustrate how a jurisdiction could 
construct such a system.  The idea is to provide a scale with benchmark 
examples with which to compare a current situation to the exemplars.  I 
have used driving exemplars because they are common and provide 
simple comparisons.  Thus, a case involving medical malpractice or 
products liability, for instance, would be comparing the degree of 
wrongfulness to the exemplars even though they relate to a different 
kind of behavior.32  Judges are already accustomed to making such 
comparisons when discussing cases for remittitur, and jurors could make 
good use of the same kind of information.33 
 
 32.  Reconsider the case of Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 
1999), where the plaintiff, a construction worker, developed lung disease after working with 
defendant’s asbestos product for years.  The plaintiff established that the company continued to 
manufacture the product with asbestos rather than safer materials after it learned of the hazards of 
asbestos.  This behavior would be analogous to a truck driver failing to use an accessible flare to 
warn cars of his or her stalled truck in a roadway in the dark where there is a significant likelihood 
of other vehicles crashing into truck—the example of reckless behavior on the sample scale of 
wrongfulness. 
 33. See, e.g., Moore v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying 
Texas law: appropriate factors include comparisons of the nature of the wrong, the character of the 
conduct involved, and the defendant’s degree of culpability); Alkire v. First Nat’l Bank of Parsons, 
475 S.E.2d 122 (W.Va. 1996) (appropriate comparative factors include the relationship between the 
10
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The reason for the “betweens” in the scale is to satisfy the 
inevitable situations where the actual case seems to fall between two 
situations. 
A.  Degree of wrongfulness 
½ No wrongfulness; strict liability basis for recovery 
1 Small negligence: Defendant took a small but unnecessary risk of 
harm to others (such as inattention for a moment when driving) 
3 Between small and common negligence 
5 Common negligence: Defendant took an unnecessary risk of harm 
to others (such as driving at the speed limit when road conditions 
and/or visibility are too poor for driving that fast) 
7 Between common and significant negligence 
9 Significant negligence: Defendant took a large and unnecessary risk 
of significant harm to others (such as a driver of a car racing across 
train tracks to beat a fast approaching train) 
11 Between significant negligence and gross negligence 
13 Gross negligence: Defendant took large risk of harm with no social 
utility to risk (such as drunk driving) 
15 Between gross negligence and recklessness 
17 Recklessness: Defendant acted deliberately in reckless disregard for 
the safety of others (such as truck driver failing to use an accessible 
flare to warn cars of a stalled truck in roadway in dark where there is a 
significant likelihood of other vehicles crashing into the truck) 
19 Between recklessness and malicious behavior 
21 Malicious behavior by defendant directed toward plaintiff 
specifically or toward a small group to which plaintiff belonged (such 
 
harm from the defendant’s conduct and the damages and the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct).  See also Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
153 (1999). 
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as deliberately driving car into crowd on sidewalk)
 
B.  Severity of the Harm 
The scale for the severity of the harm to the victim contemplates a 
crude division of injuries into categories based on degree of severity.  
This scale does not contemplate special conditions of the victim.  For 
example, the injury to the hand of a concert pianist would not be a more 
severe harm than the injury of an ordinary person’s hand.  Similarly, the 
“eggshell head” plaintiff who suffered greater harm than normally 
expected from a certain type of injury would not receive compensation 
for those additional injuries.  It should be permissible, however, to 
include the life expectancy of the victim as a factor relevant to the 
severity of the harm, such that a permanent disability to a younger 
person might be a step higher on the severity scale than a similar injury 
to a retired person, simply because of the differing amount of 
productivity that would be impaired over the remaining life expectancy. 
 
1/4 Technical injury only, no monetary loss 
1/2 Minimal injury, no permanent effect, little productivity lost (such 
as little or no time lost from work), small medical bills 
1 Notable injury, treatment by specialists, some productivity lost 
(such as some time lost from work or other consequences from 
temporary disability) and medical bills beyond the “small” ones of a 
minimal injury (such as broken bones) 
3 Between notable and significant injury 
5 Significant injury (which may include hospitalization) months lost 
of work, and/or very large medical bills, with some permanent effects 
but not a permanent and serious disability (such as loss of limb) 
7 Between significant and permanent injury 
9 Permanent and material injury that permanently alter ability to live 
normally (such as loss of limb) 
11 Between permanent and catastrophic injury 
13 Catastrophic injury to formerly productive and healthy person who 
12
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experiences significant impairment in the ability to work and enjoy 
important aspects of life (e.g. paralysis)
 
C.  Degree of Connection 
This scale contemplates several factors that are also relevant in the 
first instance to the determination of liability.  Even when liability is 
found, these factors should be relevant to the determination of damages: 
the degree of connection in time and space; number and significance of 
intervening events; relationship between plaintiff and defendant (versus 
indirect contact through marketing); degree to which defendant is solely 
responsible for the harm; and other factors that attenuate the injury from 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct. 
 
1/2 Distant connection, because of time, space, intervening forces (such 
as third persons who contributed to the injury), indirect relation of the 
plaintiff to the defendant 
3/4 Between distant and direct 
1 Direct connection between defendant’s wrong and plaintiff’s harm, 
with little distance in time or space, no third party intervening forces, 
and no other attenuating factors 
 
Contribution: Degree of plaintiff’s own contribution to injury 
 
1 No contributory negligence 
3/4 Plaintiff’s failure to use due care contributed 75% to the injury 
1/2 Plaintiff’s failure to use due care contributed 50% to the injury 
1/4 Plaintiff’s failure to use due care contributed 25% to the injury 
IV.  FORMULAS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
A.  Formulas 
Once scales are established to define severity, wrongfulness, and 
degree of connectedness, the crucial issue becomes how to relate the 
13
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scales to recovery.  A jurisdiction would need a formula that reflects its 
values for compensating personal injury plaintiffs.  The three factors of 
severity, wrongfulness, and connectedness can be weighed in any 
fashion.  A simple formula would be most accessible, but a multiple 
regression equation [y = (a x wrongfulness) + (b x severity) + (c x 
connectedness) + K] would be most accurate at achieving the desired 
results. 
Jurisdictions would also need a monetary indicator to which to 
apply the formula.  It would be useful if the indicator were pegged to 
some number that reflects inflation and economic trends.  It could be a 
fixed number that adjusts with the CPI, or it could be some number that 
otherwise reflects economic conditions, such as some percentage of the 
median price for homes. 
For purposes of the following illustrations, I have chosen a simple 
formula and an indicator pegged to the national median price of a home.  
There is no magic to these choices; they simply show the practical dollar 
effect of the proposal and produce results for the “ordinary case” that 
reflect current trends in personal injury awards.  If one begins by 
observing the current median award in a run-of-the-mill personal injury 
case, then it is possible to see how the award is altered respectively by 
changes in the wrongfulness, severity, and connectedness.
 
B.  Illustrations 
The bottom line of these illustrations is that the proposal will keep 
damages in the small cases small, but it will add attorney’s fees as an 
incentive to have them resolved. The historically blockbusting personal 
injury cases would yield lower damages under this proposal.  The most 
severely injured plaintiffs will not “win the lottery” in the tort system, 
particularly not with a large punitive damage award, but they will still 
have a large enough recovery to provide incentives for structured 
settlements that can provide for them in their lifetimes. 
The relatively large reduction in awards to severely injured 
plaintiffs is tempered by the provision of reasonable attorney’s fees. 
Therefore, in order to compare the recoveries for severely injured 
plaintiffs in these illustrations to the recoveries of their current tort 
plaintiff counterparts, it is necessary to reduce the current recoveries by 
a third to reflect the typical one third contingency fee arrangement that 
now prevails in such cases.  Thus, under current law, a plaintiff who 
wins an award of one and a half million dollars loses one third (half a 
million dollars) to the attorney. 
14
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In these illustrations, the forumula simply multiplies the 
wrongfulness, severity, connectedness, indicator, and contribution.  It is 
mathematically the simplest formula based on the proposed scales 
above. 
For purposes of these illustrations, the indicator number roughly 
represents ten percent of the national median price for a home, $20,000.  
It has the advantage of providing a easy contrast for the differing 
situations below. 
1.  Example # 1 
Future defendant driver D and future plaintiff P were driving on a 
freeway during a rush hour commute.  D was fiddling with the radio and 
therefore failed to see that the traffic had suddenly stopped.  D’s car 
crashed into the back of P’s car and caused P’s airbag to inflate. P 
suffered a shoulder injury, which caused some medical expenses and a 
little lost time from work. 
If this case were to get to trial, the trier of fact might find the 
following numbers in this situation: 
 
Wrongfulness = small negligence = 1/2 
Severity = minimal injury = 1/2 
Connection = direct connection = 1 
Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1 
 
Formula: 1/2 x 1/2 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $5,000 
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees 
Plus interest from date of accident 
Example # 1 variations 
If we discover that D was driving drunk at the time of the accident, 
then the wrongfulness number goes to 13, and the calculation would be 
13 x 1/2 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $130,000, plus attorney’s fees and interest. 
If P negligently changed lanes in front of D when D was fiddling 
with the radio, the comparative negligence rules of the jurisdiction 
would reduce the award accordingly. 
2.  Example # 2 
Defendant 1, a drunk driver, hits Plaintiff, a pedestrian, and caused 
injuries that require several operations and preclude the Plaintiff from 
15
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working for one year.  The City, Defendant 2, contributed to injury by 
failing to remove a dangerous object from side of road, which further 
injured the Plaintiff who was thrown by the impact of the car.  The 
Plaintiff failed to look when stepping into the roadway. 
If this case were to get to trial, the trier of fact might find the 
following numbers in this situation: 
 
Defendant 1 - drunk driver 
 
Wrongfulness = gross negligence = 13 
Severity = significant injury = 5 
Connection = direct connection = 1 
Contribution = contributory negligence = ½ 
 
Formula: 13 x 5 x 1 x $20,000 x 1/2 = $650,000 
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees 
Plus interest from date of accident 
 
Defendant 2 – city 
 
Wrongfulness = minimal negligence = 1/2 
Severity = significant injury = 5 
Connection = distant connection = 1/2 
Contribution = contributory negligence = 1/2 
 
Formula: 1/2 x 5 x 1/2 x $20,000 x 1  = $25,000 
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees 
Plus interest from date of accident 
3.  Example # 3 
Reconsider the baby who was earlier hypothesized to suffer brain 
damage in an auto accident from the unforeseen design defect in a child 
restraint device.  Assuming that the jurisdiction permits liability and that 
the defect in the car seat, if knowable, would foreseeably cause harm to 
a child in a car crash and thus be directly connected to the injury. The 
trier of fact might find as follows: 
 
Wrongfulness = technical = 1/4 
Severity = catastrophic injury = 21 
Connection = direct connection = 1 
16
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Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1 
 
Formula: 1/4 x 21 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $105,000 
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees 
Plus interest from date of accident 
 
The wrongfulness factor significantly reduces an award for a severe 
injury, such as a products liability case. Although critics may say that 
this reform is at the expense of innocent victims (such as this baby), the 
counterargument is that jurisdictions could permit liability in such 
circumstances without fear of exposing businesses to excessive liability 
from multiple victims.34  Further, manufacturers would have a strong 
incentive to cure such a defect once it is known (as under present law) 
because the wrongfulness number would rise dramatically if the design 
defect is not corrected once it is known. 
The theory for the tradeoff in such a products liability case—
permitting liability with a smaller recovery plus attorney’s fees—is that 
greater numbers of victims in products liability cases could recover more 
predictably, yet defendants would not have unchecked exposure to 
liability.  Attorneys for plaintiffs would still have an incentive to prove 
that the injury was caused by a defect because the costs of such a 
successful investigation would be recoverable fees, and the novelty of 
the claim would be an appropriate multiplier for the attorney’s fees, like 
current civil rights law.  Thus, the benefit of the current system in 
uncovering behavior, such as product defects, that causes injuries would 
not be lost because attorneys could still recover substantial fees even if 
their clients do not receive very high awards.  The clients would receive 
enough of an award to support a good structured settlement or to 
purchase a good annuity; thus, the injured parties would still have an 
incentive to pursue their claims even in the absence of a possible 
windfall.  The manufacturer would have an incentive to settle quickly 
with other claimants—thus distributing that possible windfall to other 
victims who would recover more quickly—because of the mounting 
costs of additional attorney’s fees and interest that will result from delay.
 
4.  Example # 4 
Defendants, homeowners, failed to fix boards on the front steps that 
 
 34. For a discussion of the inconsistencies in punitive damages awards under current law, see 
the article in this forum, Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards, 
39 AKRON L. REV. 1019 (2006). 
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they knew to be rotting.  The defect was not obvious, but the boards 
collapsed from the rot when Plaintiff, a social guest, fell through them 
and suffered a broken ankle.  The homeowners had forgotten to warn  
Plaintiff about the rotting steps.  Assume that Plaintiff’s status as a 
visitor on the land would permit recovery in the jurisdiction.  A fact 
finder could find: 
 
Wrongfulness = small negligence = 1 
Severity = notable injury = 1 
Connection = direct connection = 1 
Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1 
 
Formula: 1 x 1 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $20,000 
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees 
Plus interest from date of accident
 
5.  Example # 5 
Defendant owns a large dog known to be vicious toward children, 
but lets the dog run unrestrained.  The dog attacked a child on the way 
home from school and caused a permanent and disfiguring facial scar 
from its bite. A trier of fact could find: 
 
Wrongfulness = recklessness = 19 
Severity = permanent injury = 9 
Connection = direct connection = 1 
Contribution = no contributory negligence = 1 
 
Formula: 19 x 9 x 1 x $20,000 x 1 = $361,000 
Plus reasonable hourly attorney’s fees 
Plus interest from date of accident 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The state of personal injury damages law is shockingly bad.  The 
public appears to have lost confidence in the tort system and, although 
that loss of confidence may not be for reasons that I would consider the 
“right” ones, this loss of confidence presents an opportunity to 
reconsider the function and functionality of this area of the law. 
Current personal injury damages law involves costly trial 
preparation that yields a highly unpredictable monetary outcome even 
when the defendant admits liability.  This article proposes to streamline 
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much of the personal injury damage law by creating gross categories of 
injury and restricting proof of injury to evidence that relates only to 
proper categorization.  For example, matters such as the expense of adult 
diapers for a lifetime would not be admissible, whereas medical bills 
would be admissible as an indication of the severity of the injury.  Most 
notably, pain and suffering evidence would not be admissible, and such 
awards would be subsumed by the overall severity of the injury 
category. 
Secondly, the proposed scheme would make the degree of the 
defendant’s wrongfulness an overt basis for adjusting the personal injury 
award.  The propensity of juries to make such an adjustment without 
instruction suggests that it should be permitted and done in a manner that 
is transparent.  The proposal is to have a scale of wrongfulness that 
serves to adjust the award upwards or downwards, depending on 
whether the conduct was malicious at one extreme or a matter of strict 
liability at the other extreme.  This scale would replace punitive damages 
because it permits an adjustment of compensatory damages on the basis 
of wrongfulness. 
Third, the proposal includes an adjustment for connectedness, 
meaning that the compensatory damages are adjusted downwards when 
the facts show a remote connection between the defendant’s wrong and 
the plaintiff’s injury.  This factor supplements the proximate cause 
inquiry.  Whereas courts still may use the element of proximate cause to 
deny liability altogether, the advantage of this element in the damage 
calculation is that it permits liability to go forward—but to be reduced—
when the connection is remote.  For example, when there are intervening 
forces that separate the defendant’s negligence from the plaintiff’s 
injury, recovery will be reduced, if it is permitted at all. 
When these three factors of wrongfulness, severity, and 
connectedness are determined numerically on a scale chosen by a 
jurisdiction, they would need to be related to some monetary indicator—
some identifiable number fixed by the legislature and adjusted for 
inflation, or perhaps pegged to some easily identifiable number such as a 
percentage of the median home price at the time of the injury. 
The formula used to relate the three factors of wrongfulness, 
severity, and connectedness to the indicator would reflect the 
jurisdiction’s public policy about the manner and degree that it wishes to 
compensate personal injury victims.35  The formula could be complex or 
 
 35. See generally Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort and the Overlooked Legacy of 
the Progressives and Populists, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943 (2006). 
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simple.  The advantage of a complex formula is that it can fine-tune 
interests, but the disadvantage is its relative lack of accessibility and 
transparency. 
Finally, the resulting monetary award can be adjusted by the 
jurisdiction’s rules on comparative negligence.  This proposal does not 
affect that area of the law, nor does it affect the substantive basis of 
liability.  It simply proposes replacing the typical measures of 
compensatory damages with these three factors. 
Two important additional elements of recovery are reasonable 
attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs and interest from the time of the 
accident.  These factors promote early settlement and justify the overall 
lower awards. 
The advantages of this proposal are that more tort victims will 
recover for their injuries with the assistance of counsel, and the amount 
of the award will reflect not only the severity of their injuries, but also 
the wrongfulness of the conduct and the degree to which the defendant’s 
wrong is connected to the injury.  With this re-focus on the nature of 
compensatory damages, punitive damages can be eliminated because the 
concepts underlying punitive awards are subsumed in compensatory 
damages.  Further, courts could permit changes in the substantive law of 
torts without the concern of creating excessive liability.  Finally, as a 
result of the reduced costs of trial preparation, more dollars would reach 
the pockets of the victims. A reconceptualization of compensatory 
damages—ending the focus on compensation as the primary goal—
could advance tort reform far more than the special interest legislative 
reforms of recent years. 
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